Will Russia invade Crimea?

France's foreign minister accused Moscow recently of handing out Russian passports to Ukrainian citizens living in the Crimean peninsula. Crimea has a Russian majority, ethnically-speaking, and many (including prominent Russian politicians) have speculated that it could be reincorporated back into Russia. The peninsula has strategic importance in that it's home to the naval base of Russia's large Black Sea Fleet – an arrangement that Ukraine has recently begun to oppose. The handing out of passports is a threatening gesture, as protecting newly-minted Russian citizens was Russia's justification for invading South Ossetia and Abkhazia this summer. Foreign Minister Kouchner notes the obvious: that a "danger exists" that Russia will use these new citizens as a pretext to occupy Crimea and eastern Ukraine – but he also says that he doubts Russia will go through with it. Of course, he'd say that no matter what the truth were, but in this case, I'm inclined to believe him.

The threat to the Ukrainian government that these new Russian citizens on Ukrainian territory pose is useful in and of itself as Russia vies for control of Ukraine's top politicians. And though Russia handed out passports in South Ossetia and later invaded, residents of Transnistria (a pro-Russian break-away province in northern Moldova) already have Russian passports, and an explicit Russian occupation of Transnistria looks unlikely. Ultimately, I think that invading Crimea – which shares no border with the Russian Federation – would be too blatant of a move for Russia. For now, it looks like Russia is using the passports as leverage against Ukraine's leaders – but if the Ukrainians fail to yield to Russia, an invasion would be more likely. But I doubt that Russia will fail in co-opting such a weak political establishment as Ukraine's.

The mayor of Moscow's foreign policy

The NYT today has a great profile of Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov and his penchant for conducting foreign policy. Luzhkov's nationalistic style is similar to that of the Eurasianist Aleksandr Dugin, but unlike Dugin, Luzhkov actually has a budget to back himself up. Anonymous sources within the administrated cited "hundreds of millions of dollars" as the total spending of Moscow on regions outside of Russia. These regions included South Ossetia (pre-war), which he plied with food, medical aid, "dump trucks, tents and cranes," and where he repaired a highway that was ultimately used by South Ossetian separatists during the war. And there's also Abkhazia, the old Soviet apparatchiks' favorite beach spot, where the City of Moscow has become a major investor. And though the Russian government (as opposed to the Moscow government) also contributed a lot of aid to these regions before their invasions this summer, the Times notes that "Mr. Luzhkov often seems to take the lead."

More ominously, Luzhkov has also been pouring resources into Crimea, an majority Russian port city deep within Ukraine's territory, and also home of Russia's formidable Black Sea Naval Fleet. In Crimea, Luzhkov has built housing for Russia's military, "a branch of Moscow State University" (??), as well as many other non-military infrastructure projects. He has very open revanchist views about Crimea, "[calling] for Russia to reclaim Crimea from Ukraine."

But ultimately, the article's author notes, Luzhkov "is not a member of Mr. Putin's inner circle." While Putin might find his foreign policy adventures helpful, Luzhkov himself cannot initiate a Russian military invasion simply by building roads and schools. There are a lot of differences between Georgia and Ukraine. Most importantly, Ukraine is not an alternative to Russian energy for Europe. Whereas Georgia is a competitor with Russia when it comes to bringing Caspian Sea natural gas into Europe, Ukraine is not. Secondly, Georgia is ruled by an increasingly authoritarian Mikheil Saakashvili, who has shown himself to not be receptive to Russian subjugation, whereas Ukraine's political establishment is much more vulnerable to Russian meddling.

Like Georgia, Ukraine has value for Russia: namely, its access to the Black Sea. But in the end, I do not think Russia will move to reclaim eastern Ukraine or the Crimean peninsula. It would be much less controversial to simply work to influence Ukraine's leaders (as Russia has done in Belarus), rather than launch an invasion against Ukraine. Whereas Russia could invade Georgia with minimal repercussions, an invasion of Ukraine – so close to Europe – would have a lot more consequences.

The Orange Revolution turns red

I haven't posted much about the political crisis in Ukraine, because I thought it was pretty cut and dry, and I sort of forget that not everyone follows Eastern European politics as closely as I do. So, essentially what has happened is that the South Ossetian war has frightened the people of Ukraine, as well as its political establishment, and the already shaky "Orange" liberal coalition partners – Yushchenko and Tymoshenko – have been divided. Tymoshenko and her bloc refused to share in Yushchenko's condemnation of the Russian actions in Georgia, and she's given in to the heavy pressure to ally herself with Russia, at least for the moment. Ukraine has a sizable Russian minority, and an even larger amount of people in the eastern half of the country who have pro-Russian sentiments. Crimea has a bare Russian majority, and is home to Russia's formidable Black Sea Fleet, and as such could be vulnerable to the same sort of Russian revanchism that happened in Georgia.

Anyway, President Yushchenko has dissolved parliament, and new elections will happen in a few months. Tymoshenko's political stars are clearly on the rise, and in the midst of the crisis she's been to the Kremlin to negotiate Ukraine's natural gas deals with Russia, an issue near and dear to Ukrainians' hearts since Russia shut off gas pipes to Ukraine around New Years 2006. While in Moscow, Tymoshenko pushed for closer ties between the two countries' big state energy concerns – Naftogaz and Gazprom. This was seen as a power play by Yushchenko's supporters, as it came in the middle of this political crisis that was directly related to Ukraine's relations with Russia, and tensions flared when Yushchenko's supporters alleged that Tymoshenko really went to Russia to get the backing of the Russians, who still play a very active role in Ukrainian politics.

According to Stratfor, Russia's got a "wild card" up their sleeve in the form of Ukraine's richest oligarch, Rinat Akhmetov, who is apparently the "puppetmaster" behind Ukraine's large pro-Russian Party of Regions. Stratfor says that his power over Ukrainian politics has "grown exponentially" in recent years, and that ultimately he is "firmly held by the Kremlin," which very well might use him to seal the deal in the December elections. Though at the rate it's going – with Tymoshenko having defected, and Yushchenko's approval ratings below 10% – they might not even have to use him.

Pirates shed some light on energy geopolitics

The ongoing stand-off between Somali pirates who hijacked a Ukrainian freighter loaded with weaponry and US warships likely isn't going to end in a $20 million ransom like the pirates want. However, what's more interesting is what's on the ship, where it's going, and who it came from. What's on the ship, we know: "tanks, artillery, grenade launchers and ammunition." Where it's going, though, gets a bit more interesting:

Kenyan officials continued to maintain that the weapons aboard were part of a legitimate arms deal for the Kenyan military, even though several Western diplomats, Somali officials and the pirates themselves said the arms were part of a secret deal to funnel the weapons to southern Sudan.

The Kenyan government's insistence that the weapons are for its own use doesn't hold water: the Kenyan military is trained by Western forces, and has not received the training necessary to use Russian tanks (which the equipment onboard was), according to Voice of America. The southern region of Sudan, however, holds two distinctions that make it likely that that's where the weapons were heading: it was the site of the most deadly war since World War II, and has vast oil resources. The Second Sudanese Civil War raged for over twenty years, and though it officially ended in 2005, the fighting persists and the conflict could reignite at any time. The uneasy treaty stipulated that the South is to be autonomous until 2011, when a referendum on independence will take place.

Which brings us to last question: where did the weapons come from? According to the VOA article, southern Sudan receives weapons from both the US and Russia, though given that the US isn't going along with the Kenyan story about the destination of the weapons, it seems likely that the Russian weapons aboard the Ukrainian ship came instead from Russia. Given that they were destined for an oil-filled region brimming with instability, it seems likely that this is part of the Kremlin's broader plan to destabilize oil- and gas-producing regions in order to raise the price of energy and feed the Russian petrostate's need for high oil prices.